





In 2008 Michael Tooley addressed the problem of evil in his fine contri-
butions to the book Knowledge of God, which he co-authored with Alvin 
Plantinga.1 Here is his main conclusion (MC):
[Quotation 1] Consequently, unless there is countervailing positive evidence in 
support of the existence of God, or unless belief in the existence of God can be 
shown to be non-inferentially justified, and in a way that is not easily defeasi-
ble, the argument from evil establishes not only that one cannot know that God 
exists, but also, and even more unhappily, that it is unlikely—indeed, extremely 
unlikely—that God exists.2
Tooley’s argument is original and ingenious. These features suffice to 
make it well worth discussing; a secondary reason for examining it is that 
some of its leading ideas are likely to be influential via their inclusion in 
1 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008. In Tooley, 2012a, 2012b, Tooley revisits parts of the argu-
ment from evil I am discussing here. He neither recants anything nor adds anything that 
affects my treatment of what he says in his 2008 chapters.
2 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 146. Would anyone want to deny the following propo-
sition? If our total evidence did not include empirical truths that provide significant sup-
port for the existence of kangaroos, and no one was non-inferentially justified in believing 
that kangaroos exist, then no one would be justified in believing that kangaroos exist, and it 
would be extremely unlikely that kangaroos exist. To give MC interest and dialectical bite, 
one option is to construe it as asserting or implying: The argument from evil establishes 
that if our total evidence does not include empirical truths that provide significant support 
for the existence of God, and we are not non-inferentially justified in believing that God 
exists, then the probability that God exists, relative to our total evidence, is significantly 
lower than the a priori probability that God exists.
178 Bruce Langtry
Tooley’s online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article ‘The Problem 
of Evil’.3
In 1991 Tooley, like William L. Rowe and other authors recently advanc-
ing evidentialist arguments from evil against the existence of God, had 
formulated the issues in axiological terms.4 Tooley now believes, how-
ever, that such approaches encounter difficulties in connecting the good-
ness or badness of states of affairs with putative divine actions.5 So in 
Knowledge of God he favours a deontological formulation, which avoids 
axiological concepts and focuses instead on the moral rightness and 
moral wrongness of actions and on rightmaking and wrongmaking 
properties of actions.6
Tooley divides his overall deontological argument from evil into three 
stages. The first two lay the foundations for his argument in the third, 
and are important for that reason.7 The interim conclusion emerging 
from the first two stages is:
(21) The logical probability that God did not exist at the time of the 
Lisbon earthquake, given that choosing not to prevent the Lisbon 
earthquake has a wrongmaking property that we know of, and that 
there are no rightmaking properties that are known to be counterbal-
ancing, is greater than one half.
Of course, (21) by itself is no threat to theism. The logical probability 
that kangaroos did not exist at the time of the Lisbon earthquake, given 
that choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a wrongmak-
ing property that we know of, and that there are no rightmaking proper-
ties that are known to be counterbalancing, is greater than one half. This 
truth is not much of an objection to the existence of kangaroos at the 
time. No doubt Tooley would agree.
3 Tooley, 2012b. 4 Tooley, 1991, and (e.g.) Rowe, 1979, 1996.
5 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 105–6. In Tooley, 1991, he relied on the premise An omnis-
cient and morally perfect person would prevent the existence of any intrinsically undesirable 
state of affairs whose prevention it could achieve without either allowing an equal or greater 
evil, or preventing an equal or greater good. But this premise is subject to decisive objec-
tions. I discussed the 1991 paper in Langtry, 2008, 193–6.
6 From now on, for brevity’s sake, I will omit the word ‘moral’ before ‘rightness’ and 
‘wrongness’, and will omit the word ‘morally’ before ‘right’, ‘obligatory’, ‘wrong’, ‘permis-
sible’, and ‘impermissible’ (except in quotations).
7 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 117–22, 126–31, 134–44.
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In the third stage of the overall argument for MC, Tooley employs 
Rudolf Carnap’s inductive logic to argue for the lemma
(G3) If S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn are states of affairs that are preventable, 
respectively, at times t1, t2, t3, t3, t4, . . . tn, and are such that, for each Si, 
choosing not to prevent Si is an action that, judged by known right-
making and wrongmaking properties, is prima facie wrong, then 
the probability, all things considered—including relevant, unknown 
rightmaking and wrongmaking properties—that there is an omnipo-
tent, omniscient, morally perfect, and omnitemporal person is less 
than 1/(n + 1).
He then argues that n must be very large, and therefore 1/(n + 1) must 
be very small, on the ground that a huge number of people undergo 
one or more events that, judged by the rightmaking and wrongmaking 
properties of which we have knowledge, they should not have to suffer. 
He appears to believe that G3 and a high value for n together directly 
yield MC.
1. Tooley’s First Stage: The Introduction 
of Rightmaking and Wrongmaking 
Properties
There is no need here for me to set out in full the twenty-one formal 
steps of the first stage. It will suffice for my purposes to state four of the 
premises.
(12) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the 
death of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a wrongmaking prop-
erty of actions, and a very serious one.
(13) The Lisbon earthquake killed approximately 60,000 ordinary 
people.
(16) For any action whatever, the logical probability that the total 
wrongmaking properties of the action outweigh the total rightmaking 
properties—including ones of which we have no knowledge—given 
that the action has a wrongmaking property that we know of, and that 
there are no rightmaking properties that are known to be counterbal-
ancing, is greater than one half.
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(17) It is a logically necessary truth that, for any action C, if the total 
wrongmaking properties of the action outweigh the total rightmak-
ing properties—including ones of which we have no knowledge—then 
action C is morally wrong, all things considered.
I will be arguing throughout this chapter that Tooley lacks a satisfactory 
account of rightmaking and wrongmaking, and that accordingly his 
argument from evil runs into trouble at many points. Thus in the rest of 
this section I will quote what he explicitly says about rightmaking and 
wrongmaking, and in the next section I will explore his account further. 
The results of the inquiry will be employed in later sections.
Tooley introduces his qualitative concepts of rightmaking and wrong-
making properties by saying that they can be ‘implicitly defined’ by the 
following ‘theory’ (T):
[Quotation 2] There are two second-order properties—namely, the property of 
being a right-making property and the property of being a wrongmaking prop-
erty—such that if an action possesses at least one property that is a wrongmak-
ing property, and no property that is a rightmaking property, then the action is 
morally wrong, while if an action possesses at least one property that is a right-
making property, and no property that is a wrongmaking property, then the 
action is morally right.8
T is supplemented in the following passages:
[Quotation 3] A complete moral ontology must involve more, however, than 
qualitative rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, since such properties 
cannot by themselves determine the status of actions that have both rightmak-
ing and wrongmaking properties, or actions where the objective probabilities 
of various rightmaking and wrongmaking properties being present have values 
other than zero and one. If such actions are to have a determinate moral status, 
there must be quantitative rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, so that 
there are numbers associated with rightmaking and wrongmaking properties 
that represent the moral weight, or seriousness, of the properties in question. 
The idea of quantitative rightmaking and wrongmaking properties can be 
explicated by whatever method seems most satisfactory for quantitative prop-
erties in general. Then, given the idea of quantitative rightmaking and wrong-
making properties, we can say that when an action possesses both rightmaking 
and wrongmaking properties, its moral status depends on the moral weights 
8 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 115. The implicit definitions provided by T can, Tooley 
says, be converted into explicit definitions, using some standard method for defining the-
oretical terms, such as a Ramsey/Lewis approach.
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of the various properties. Thus, for example, if the weight of the wrongmaking 
properties, taken together, is greater than that of the rightmaking properties, 
taken together, then the action is morally wrong, all things considered, while if 
the weight of the rightmaking properties, taken together, is greater than that of 
the wrongmaking properties, taken together, then the action is either morally 
permissible, all things considered, or else morally obligatory.9
[Quotation 4] In this diagram [Figure 2.1], the region to the right of the vertical 
axis represents actions that one ought to perform, all things considered, and the 
farther to the right an action is located, the stronger the obligation to perform it is. 
Similarly, the region to the left of the vertical axis represents actions that are mor-
ally wrong, all things considered, and the farther to the left an action is located, the 
more wrong it is. . . . Rightmaking properties will be represented by arrows point-
ing to the right, and wrongmaking properties by arrows pointing to the left, with 
the lengths of the arrows representing the seriousness of the properties involved.10
Known morally signicant properties
Unknown morally signicant properties







actions UR = n
[Quotation 5] The proposition expressed by the sentence ‘a is a rightmaking 
property of magnitude M’ can be analyzed in terms of the notion of making an 
action right to degree M.11
[Quotation 6] One can ask, ‘What property did the action of permitting the 
Lisbon earthquake have that made it morally permissible for God to permit 
it? . . . The property of having been permitted by God, who is perfectly good, . . . while 
9 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 115–16.
10 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 126–7. Notice a discrepancy between Quotations 3 and 4. 
Quotation 4 suggests that all actions are either wrong or obligatory (except those scor-
ing 0), and that positive numerical numbers attached to actions measure obligations’ 
degrees of strength. Quotation 3, however, suggests that some positive numerical num-
bers attached to actions, those in the lower range, pertain to permissible but not obligatory 
actions and measure how close the actions are to obligatoriness, while those in the higher 
range order the obligatory actions with respect to strength of obligation.
11 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 239.
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it entails that there must have been a rightmaking property, is not itself a rightmak-
ing property.12
2. The Need for Clarification 
of the Foregoing Account
2.1 Calculating Combined Weights
In determining the combined weight of an action’s total rightmaking 
properties, and the combined weight of its wrongmaking properties, 
and thereby calculating a number that represents the moral status of 
an action, Tooley relies on simple addition and subtraction. The Nullity 
Argument advanced in section 3 constitutes an objection to this ‘additive 
vector’ model. Furthermore, independently of the Nullity Argument, it 
is apparent that Tooley’s model requires a lot of further work to render it a 
secure footing for his theorizing. For:
(i) Tooley needs to exclude the possibility that some of an action’s 
rightmaking properties have neither greater weight than, nor less 
weight than, nor the same weight as, some of its other rightmaking 
properties and some of its wrongmaking properties—for example 
(some people claim), the properties Enabling one to create great 
works of art and Causing distress and harm to one’s family.
(ii) He also needs to deal with the following technical problem. Let 
P1 and P2 be wrongmaking properties such that P1 has weight 
a, and P2 has weight b, and P1 entails P2, but P2 does not entail 
P1—for example, stealing $30 and stealing more than $10. Are 
we to say that their combined weight is a + b, or would saying 
this involve double counting of b?13 One option would be to say 
that in calculating an action’s total wrongmaking properties, 
we should include the weights only of its wrongmaking proper-
ties that do not entail any other wrongmaking properties. But 
adopting this proposal would generate the need for elaborate 
further explanation, and for revision of Tooley’s core argument. 
For example, the weight of the property of choosing not to pre-
vent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 
12 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 238.   13 a and b are negative numbers.
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ordinary people would not get included when calculating the 
moral status of an action, since the action’s having this prop-
erty entails its having the property of choosing not to prevent 
an event that will cause the death of more than 49,999 ordinary 
people (and so on).
(iii) Consider a single charitable action that possesses the rightmak-
ing properties helping needy individual 1, helping needy individual 
2, . . . helping needy individual n. It is not obvious that the weight of 
the totality of these n rightmaking properties is equal to the sum 
of the weights of each property. Tooley needs to argue against the 
conjecture that, whatever the order in which we take the proper-
ties, there is a decline in the marginal contribution of each addi-
tional property’s weight to the weight of the totality.
2.2. Rightmaking and Wrongmaking as Essential 
Properties of Properties
Although T and Quotations 3–5 do not settle the matter, I will argue that 
Tooley holds that for all wrongmaking properties P, being wrongmak-
ing and having such-and-such a negative weight are essential properties 
of P; they do not vary from instance to instance of P, depending on the 
instance’s (first-order) properties and on the context, and do not vary 
from one time to another time or from one (logically possible) world to 
another (logically possible) world. 14 Tooley’s holding this view will play 
an important role in my Nullity Argument. There are two reasons for 
ascribing it to Tooley:
(a) If he did not hold this view then he would surely see that he should 
qualify his premise (12)15—for example, so that what it says is 
that the relevant property is in some circumstances very seriously 
wrongmaking. He would also surely see that in order to be justified 
in asserting inferring his (14) Any action of choosing not to prevent 
the Lisbon earthquake has a very serious wrongmaking property 
from the conjunction of (12) with (13), he needed to argue that in the 
actual world if anyone chose not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake, 
then their action of choosing occurred in circumstances such that 
14 I am using ‘logically possible’, ‘logically necessary’, and ‘world’ in accordance with 
the explanations in Langtry, 2008, 40–1.
15 (12), along with premises (13), (16), and (17), was stated at the beginning of my section 1.
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the relevant property is in such circumstances wrongmaking. He 
does not in fact show any signs of recognizing such a need.16
(b) If Tooley were to adopt a view contrary to the one I think he holds, 
substantial revisions would be required to his probabilistic strategy 
in stage 3 of his overall argument. Tooley proposes to derive a for-
mula that places an upper bound on the probability that none of the 
n states of affairs S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn mentioned in G3 is really such 
that it is wrong to allow that state of affairs to occur.17 The deriva-
tion involves taking the number of structure-descriptions involv-
ing S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn together with the positive maximal predicates 
corresponding to the unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking 
properties, and dividing it by the number of structure-descriptions 
involving S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn together with the totality of the maxi-
mal predicates corresponding to the k unknown rightmaking 
and wrongmaking properties.18 But if whether or not a property 
is wrongmaking varied from instance to instance or from world 
to world, depending on the circumstances, then there would be no 
number of unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, 
any more than there is a number of the rainy days, or a number of 
the people living in poverty.19 So Tooley’s k would have no numeri-
cal value, not even zero.
2.3. Parsimony with Respect to Properties
Although Tooley’s argument employs Carnap’s inductive logic, which 
does not rest on any metaphysically serious talk of properties, Tooley says 
that to formulate key principles underlying his probabilistic calculations 
16 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 119.
17 Tooley’s G3 was stated shortly before the start of section 1 of this chapter.
18 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 140–1. A state description is a conjunction of atomic 
propositions and their negations that specifies, for each actual individual, exactly what 
properties the individual has, and exactly what properties the individual does not have 
(pp. 136, 239). A structure description is a set of state descriptions that differ only with 
respect to a permutation of the individuals involved (p. 137). A predicate is maximal with 
respect to a set of properties if and only if, when applied to an individual, it indicates, 
for every property in the set, whether this individual has the property or not (p.  138). 
A Q-predicate is maximal with respect to the set of unknown rightmaking and wrong-
making properties. And a Q-predicate is positive if and only if, considering only unknown 
rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, any action to which the predicate applies is 
neither morally neutral nor impermissible (p. 140).
19 There is, of course, a number of the days in the 19th century on which rain fell on at 
least part of the area of land now occupied by Canberra, and there is a number of people 
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he needs a sparse theory of properties as genuine universals.20 He tells 
us that such a theory will rule out disjunctive universals and negative 
ones.21 He declares that the property of always choosing to do what is 
right is a genuine universal, and he evidently thinks that Being a right-
making property and Being a wrongmaking property, and Choosing not to 
prevent an event that will cause the deaths of more than 50,000 ordinary 
people are genuine universals too.22
These examples, however, leave it unclear what will be sparse 
about a theory of properties suitable for Tooley’s purposes. The word 
‘sparse’ is usually reserved for theories which affirm both that the 
distribution of genuine universals amongst the individuals in the 
world constitutes a minimal base on which all contingent truths 
supervene. If Tooley really needs a sparse theory, he needs one that, 
amongst other things,
•	 counts	in	the	examples	given	in	the	previous	paragraph	while	ruling	
out a great many putative properties,
•	 tells	us	whether	there	are	uninstantiated	universals,	and
•	 helps	us	 to	 classify,	 for	 example,	 ‘Being	 a	war’	 and	 ‘Constituting	
income tax evasion’ as either each denoting a genuine universal, or 
not, as the case may be.
Tooley does not provide such a theory, or endorse anyone else’s. He 
identifies David Armstrong’s theory as a sparse one. He cannot adopt it, 
given that Armstrong would deny that ‘being a rightmaking property’ 
and ‘being a wrongmaking property’ denote genuine (second-order) 
universals.23
I will now argue that Tooley is correct in supposing that he really does 
need a sparse theory of properties, an unusual one that allows him to 
say that Being a rightmaking property and Being a wrongmaking prop-
erty are properties. Suppose that he instead adopts a very liberal attitude 
to his own talk of properties, not regarding it as metaphysically seri-
ous. In that case, he can say that to any truth constitutively (not merely 
who would be classified as living in poverty in Australia in December 2013, according to at 
least one of the alternative, widely used ‘poverty lines’.
20 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 236–7. 21 Plantinga, 2008, 237.
22 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 237, 239, 119.
23 Cf. Armstrong’s argument for the principle that that all higher-order properties are 
formal properties, in Armstrong (1978, 138–40).
186 Bruce Langtry
epistemically) relevant to the rightness or wrongness of an action there 
corresponds some rightmaking or wrongmaking property of the action; 
furthermore, he can suppose that there are uninstantiated rightmaking 
and wrongmaking properties, such as Shooting the last trilobite. Given a 
liberal view, however, it will be hard to reject the proposition that there 
are infinitely many unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking proper-
ties. For example, let R be an unknown relation such that Your bringing 
it about that you stand in relation R to one or more other people is wrong-
making, and such that (other things being equal) the more people to 
whom you stand in relation R, the more seriously wrong is your bring-
ing it about that you stand in relation R to them. In that case, there will 
be an infinite number of wrongmaking properties x’s bringing it about 
that x stands in relation R to one person, and x’s bringing it about that x 
stands in relation R to two persons, and so on without end.
Now consider, again, Tooley’s calculation of an upper bound on the 
probability that none of the n states of affairs S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn mentioned 
in G3 is really such that it is wrong to allow that state of affairs to occur.24 
If there are infinitely many unknown rightmaking and wrongmak-
ing properties then Tooley’s k is infinitely large, and the formula Tooley 
derives for the value of P(k,n), namely
2k 2k k k
n k n k n k
− − +
+ − + − +
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1 2 1
2 1 2 2


involves dividing infinity by infinity, an illegitimate operation that can 
yield no numerical value at all for P(k, n).
3. Objections to Tooley’s Account 
of Rightmaking and Wrongmaking 
Properties, and to his Premise (17)
3.1 The Nullity Argument
Let A1 be the property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause 
the death of more than 50,000 ordinary people. As I have already indi-
cated, Tooley holds that
24 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 140–1.
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(α) A1 is a very serious wrongmaking property, in the actual world and 
in all other worlds in which it exists.
And theory T implies that
(β) If an action possesses A1, and A1 is wrongmaking, and the action 
possesses no rightmaking properties, then the action is wrong.
Let us call the following line of thought the Nullity Argument. Its 
upshot is that Tooley cannot plausibly assert both α and β. It involves 
my describing a possible world, W1, in which some action possesses A1, 
and has no rightmaking properties, and is not wrong.25 I will be working 
from inside Tooley’s theory, in order to undermine it.
In W1 there was a time at which the entire human population con-
sisted of exactly 51,000 human beings, and some event instantaneously 
annihilated them all. One microsecond later another event occurred 
which would have killed everyone if the first event had not done so 
already. There is some non-divine, non-human agent—call her ‘Alia’—
who could have prevented the first event yet chose not to. She could not 
have prevented the second event. Alia did not cause either event. She had 
not entered into any prior special relationship with anyone, or commit-
ment to anyone, in virtue of which she acquired an obligation to prevent 
any event which she could prevent and whose occurrence would cause 
the death of any of the 51,000. It follows that Alia’s action-token, X, of 
choosing not to prevent the first event possesses A1 but no wrongmak-
ing properties not entailed by A1. X does not possess the wrongmaking 
property Choosing not to prevent an event that will cause great suffering 
to many ordinary people because the event killed everyone so fast that 
it gave no one any time to suffer. X does not possess the wrongmaking 
property Choosing not to prevent an event that will shorten, by significant 
amounts, the lifespans of many ordinary people because if the event in 
question, the first event, had not occurred then the 51,000 people would 
have lived for only one more microsecond. Similarly for the properties 
Choosing not to prevent an event that will cause many people to undergo 
serious mutilation or dysfunction, and Choosing not to prevent an event 
that will preclude fulfilment of many human desires that would otherwise 
25 It is epistemically possible that W1 is the actual world, and that the relevant events 
will occur many thousands of years from now.
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have been fulfilled, and Choosing not to prevent an event that will leave 
many children unparented for a significant period of time. (For brev-
ity’s sake, I’ll call these five specified, absent properties ‘A1’s expected 
concomitants’.)
I infer from the foregoing description of W1 that in W1 X is not wrong. 
Look at it this way. In general, if an agent were to have the power to pre-
vent an event that would cause the death of more than 50,000 people, 
what reasons would he or she have, morally speaking, for doing so? 
Perhaps the agent has duties arising from special ties to individuals, or 
from his or her own past actions. I have already stipulated that in W1 this 
consideration does not apply. In general, the sudden death of more than 
50,000 people would be a very bad event, and agents have a reason to pre-
vent a very bad event. In what respects would the event be bad? Typically, 
the sudden death of more than 50,000 people would deprive these people 
of good experiences and achievements they would otherwise have had, 
it would preclude fulfilment of many human desires that would other-
wise have been fulfilled, and so on. But this truth, which would in general 
provide strong reasons for a suitably powerful and well-located agent to 
prevent an event that would cause the death of more than 50,000 people, 
is not applicable to the circumstances in W1, and so does not generate a 
reason for Alia, in W1, to prevent the fatal event (and therefore to pre-
vent the humans’ all dying one microsecond earlier than was otherwise 
inevitable).
I now declare that in W1 Alia’s action X has no rightmaking proper-
ties. This is an additional stipulation concerning W1, rather than a con-
sequence of earlier stipulations. We should consider two objections to 
its legitimacy. The first is that, necessarily, any action whatever has some 
rightmaking property, even if it happens to be very feebly rightmaking. 
Tooley must reject this claim. For if it were true then the conditional If 
an action possesses at least one property that is a wrongmaking property, 
and no property that is a rightmaking property, then the action is right (sic) 
would be necessarily true, in virtue of the necessary falsity of its anteced-
ent. Thus T would fail to provide a coherent definition of ‘rightmaking 
property’ and ‘wrongmaking property’.
The second objection is that in W1 the state of affairs consisting in 
X’s lack of A1’s expected concomitants corresponds to the property 
(A2) Lacking A1’s five specified expected concomitants, and A2 is a right-
making property of X. Not so. If Tooley were to advance this objection 
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himself, and were to agree that in W1 X is either not wrong or not seri-
ously wrong, he would have to say that A2 counterbalances, at least to 
a great extent and perhaps even completely, the great wrongmaking 
weight of A1. In that case, Tooley would have to say that A2 has great 
rightmaking weight, and (as I pointed out in section 2.2) has it in every 
context in which it is instantiated. But this is not so. For example, your 
stealing $10 would possess A2, but this fact would have no tendency to 
make your action right or to reduce your action’s degree of wrongness. 
Furthermore, consider a world W2, in which the Lisbon earthquake 
occurs and the action Choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has 
A2 and has neither A1 nor any other wrongmaking property—for exam-
ple, because a year before the earthquake some other natural disaster 
had rendered Lisbon uninhabitable by humans and by sentient animals 
for the following few years. If A2 has great rightmaking weight in W1 
then it has great rightmaking weight in W2. In that case, in W2 the action 
Choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake is fairly strongly obliga-
tory. This consequence is surely unacceptable. So we should reject the 
thought that A2 is a rightmaking property. In that case, in W1 A2 does 
not outweigh A1.
I have argued in the last few paragraphs that Alia’s action X possesses 
no rightmaking properties and yet is not wrong. It follows, via T, that X 
does not possess any wrongmaking properties. How can this be, given 
that X possesses A1?
We should conclude, contrary to Tooley’s overall position, that X’s 
lacking A1’s expected concomitants removes or nullifies what would oth-
erwise be the moral weight of X’s possessing A1 (and whatever wrong-
making properties are entailed by A1).
This conclusion fits nicely into a broader context. If there are right-
making and wrongmaking properties at all, there are other, quite dif-
ferent ways in which a rightmaking or wrongmaking property can be 
nullified, or its weight considerably reduced.
Suppose that Edith intentionally presses a button, and that her action 
(i.e. action-token) has the wrongmaking property Being the triggering 
cause of a bomb explosion in a crowded restaurant. It also has the property 
Being performed by someone captured by terrorists who dosed her heav-
ily with drugs suitable for inducing compliance with their instructions. 
Since an action is wrong only if the agent is morally responsible for it, and 
since, let us suppose, Edith was not morally responsible for her action, it 
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was not wrong.26 Now Being performed by someone captured by terrorists 
who dosed him/her heavily with drugs suitable for inducing compliance 
with their instructions is not a rightmaking property as judged by T. It 
has no tendency to confer rightness on Edith’s action-token. Indeed, it 
bestows the property Being neither permissible nor impermissible. Since 
it is has zero rightmaking weight, it does not counterbalance the wrong-
making property Edith’s action-token possesses. Instead, it nullifies the 
wrongmaking property. Presumably there are cases like Edith’s in the 
actual world.
Here is another example. Suppose that Fran speaks to Gordon. Her 
action possesses the property Being an offer of a drink of water to a thirsty 
man. It also possesses the property Being an offer of a drink of water to a 
man who is carrying a full bottle of water in his backpack. The latter prop-
erty is not a wrongmaking property of Fran’s action. It reduces, in this 
instance, the rightmaking weight of the first property.
The actions of Alia and of Edith are logically possible cases in which an 
action possesses at least one wrongmaking property and no rightmaking 
property, and yet is not wrong. Since if T is true then it is necessarily true, 
it follows that T is false.
The actions of Alia and of Edith are direct counterexamples to 
Tooley’s (17).
3.2. Attempts to Evade the Nullity Argument by Revising 
the Argument from Evil
Can Tooley respond to the Alia counterexample by abandoning his 
view that A1 is a wrongmaking property? Doing so would require 
him to replace his premises (12) and (13) as currently formulated with 
revised versions which both involve some property whose status as 
genuinely wrongmaking (judged using T) is not threatened by consid-
erations similar to those raised and also jointly entail (14). If he can do 
so, then the Nullity Argument will fail to establish that T is false. Here 
is a proposal:
(12a) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that possesses 
A1 and A1’s five specified expected concomitants is a wrongmak-
ing property of actions, and a very serious one, and
26 After all, we do not ascribe either rightness or wrongness to the actions of seagulls, 
sharks, or human babies.
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(13a) The Lisbon earthquake possessed A1 and A1’s five specified 
expected concomitants.
The proposal fails. It involves the idea that the Nullity Argument has 
a false premise, because A1 is not a wrongmaking property as defined by 
T. But even if A1 has no wrongmaking weight in the context of the speci-
fied event in W1, there are other contexts in which A1 does have wrong-
making weight. For example, consider a world W3 that is similar to W1 
except that in W3 Alia, a few days before the calamitous first event, made 
a solemn promise to prevent any event that she could prevent and that 
would cause the deaths of human beings. In W3 the fact that Alia’s action 
of choosing, X, possesses A1 counts (constitutively and not merely epis-
temically) against X. True, X has the wrongmaking property (B1) making 
a choice that will involve breaking a solemn promise to prevent any event 
that she could prevent and that will cause the deaths of human beings, and 
in the absence of counterbalancing rightmaking properties X’s having 
B1 will suffice to make X wrong. Nevertheless, as Quotation 4 indicates, 
Tooley holds that some impermissible actions are much more seriously 
wrong than others. There are many ways in which Alia could have broken 
her promise. In W3 X is a more serious violation of obligation, and so 
more seriously wrong, in virtue of X’s having A1 in addition to B1, even 
though X lacks A1’s expected concomitants. That is, X’s having A1 is con-
stitutively, and not merely causally or epistemically, related to X’s degree 
of wrongness. In that case, how can Tooley avoid acknowledging that in 
W3 A1 is wrongmaking?
So Tooley faces a dilemma: Either A1 is a wrongmaking property or 
it is not. If A1 is a wrongmaking property then the Nullity Argument 
establishes that it is logically possible (e.g. it is true in W1) that there 
be actions that possess wrongmaking properties and no rightmaking 
properties and yet are not wrong. In that case, given that if a property is 
wrongmaking then it is wrongmaking in all worlds in which it is instan-
tiated, we can infer that T is false, and premise (17) is false. If A1 is not a 
wrongmaking property then it is logically possible (e.g. it is true in W3) 
that an action’s having a certain property counts constitutively in favour 
of the action’s being more seriously wrong than it otherwise would have 
been, even though the property is not wrongmaking, as defined by 
Tooley. Unless Tooley has some argument for saying that such a prop-
erty (or a conjunction of such properties) could never either outweigh 
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or nullify the totality of an action’s rightmaking properties, T cannot 
underwrite a theory of rightmaking and wrongmaking, and (17) is false.
Could Tooley save at least some key features of his approach by making 
revisions much more far-reaching than the replacement of (12) by (12a)? 
Could he adopt the view that in general being wrongmaking and having 
such-and-such a weight are features of a property that vary from world 
to world, and from situation from situation within worlds? I discussed 
this question in section 2.2, and pointed out that if Tooley adopted it then 
major revisions to his argument for MC would be required—not only in 
the first two stages but also in the crucial third stage. A hope that a new 
account of rightmaking and wrongmaking would succeed in delivering 
some principle similar to G3 would be merely speculative.
4. Tooley’s Deontological 
Argument: Second Stage
Tooley’s second stage consists of a justification for his probabilistic prem-
ise (16), which he describes as ‘very controversial’.27 Here is (16) again:
For any action whatever, the logical probability that the total wrongmaking 
properties of the action outweigh the total rightmaking properties—including 
ones of which we have no knowledge—given that the action has a wrongmaking 
property that we know of, and that there are no rightmaking properties that are 
known to be counterbalancing, is greater than one half.
I will provide a counterexample to (16). The following argument is 
prompted by the thought that, although there are possible worlds in 
which you have little background or skill in philosophy yet acquire an 
understanding of this chapter—for example, someone spends ten hours 
explaining it to you—your actual current action-token of acquiring an 
understanding of this chapter is essentially an exercise by you of consid-
erable philosophical skill, employing an extensive background knowl-
edge of philosophy. The argument employs Tooley’s own premise (17), 
and is accordingly a kind of reductio of his position.
(a) It is logically necessary that if God exists and is omnipotent, 
omniscient, and perfectly good, then, even if it is contingent that 
27 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 120. He says that (16) ‘lies at the heart of the present formu-
lation of the argument from evil’.
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God is perfectly good, every action performed by God is essentially 
both performed by God and essentially not wrong.28 [premise]
(b) It is logically necessary that if an action is performed by God and is 
compatible with God’s perfect goodness then its total wrongmak-
ing properties do not outweigh its total rightmaking properties. 
[from (a), Tooley’s (17)]
(c) There is some possible world in which God exists and is omnip-
otent, omniscient, and perfectly good, and in which there is an 
action Y, performed by God, such that Y has a known wrongmak-
ing property and has no rightmaking properties that we know of 
and that we know to be counterbalancing.29 [premise]
(d) It is logically necessary that if Y exists then Y is essentially per-
formed by God and is essentially compatible with God’s perfect 
goodness. [from (a), (c)]
(e) It is logically necessary that if action Y exists and has a known 
wrongmaking property, and has no has no rightmaking proper-
ties that we know of and that we know to be counterbalancing, 
then Y is performed by God and is compatible with God’s perfect 
goodness. [from (d)]
(f) It is logically necessary that if action Y exists and has a known 
wrongmaking property, and has no rightmaking properties that 
we know of and that we know to be counterbalancing, then Y’s 
total wrongmaking properties do not outweigh its total rightmak-
ing properties. [from (e), (b)]
(g) The logical probability that Y’s total wrongmaking properties out-
weigh its total rightmaking properties, given that Y exists and has 
a known wrongmaking property, and that Y is has no rightmaking 
properties that we know of and that we know to be counterbalanc-
ing, is zero. [from (f)]
(h) (16), if true, is necessarily true. [premise]
(i) (16) is false. [from (g), (h)]
28 In premise (a) and elsewhere in (a)–(i), I  am using ‘action’ as an abbreviation of 
‘action–token’. This seems the sensible way to interpret the occurrence of ‘action’ in, say, 
Tooley’s premise (12).
29 (c) follows from the conjunction of Tooley’s premise (16) with the proposition that it 
is logically possible that God exists and is an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good 
being.
194 Bruce Langtry
My criticisms of Tooley’s account of the concepts of rightmaking and 
wrongmaking properties suffice to undermine Tooley’s reasoning in 
favour of (16).
5. Tooley’s Deontological 
Argument: Third Stage
In the third stage of his deontological argument, Tooley employs 
Carnap’s inductive logic to argue that
(G3) If S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn are states of affairs that are preventable, 
respectively, at times t1, t2, t3, t3, t4, . . . tn, and are such that, for each Si, 
choosing not to prevent Si is an action that, judged by known right-
making and wrongmaking properties, is prima facie wrong, then 
the probability, all things considered—including relevant, unknown 
rightmaking and wrongmaking properties—that there is an omnipo-
tent, omniscient, morally perfect, and omnitemporal person is less 
than 1/(n + 1).
He argues that n must be very large, and therefore 1/(n + 1) must be very 
small.30 He appears to believe that G3 and a high value for n together 
directly yield MC, which I stated at the beginning of this chapter:
Consequently, unless there is countervailing evidence in support of the exist-
ence of God, or unless belief in God can be shown to be non-inferentially justi-
fied, and in way that is not easily defeasible, the argument from evil establishes 
not only that one cannot know that God exists, but also, and even more unhap-
pily, that it is unlikely—indeed, extremely unlikely—that God exists.31
It should already be apparent that Tooley’s argument for G3 is unsat-
isfactory as it stands. First, I pointed out in section 2.2 that Tooley’s 
calculation of G3 depends on the hidden assumption that being wrong-
making, and having the negative weight it has, are essential features 
of a property that has them. The Nullity Argument employs this very 
30 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 142.
31 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 146. What does it take for evidence e1 for God exists to be 
countervailing against evidence e2 for God does not exist, given background evidence B? 
We should not be distracted by the question whether P(God exists/e1&B) > P(God does not 
exist/e2&B), but should focus instead on whether P(God exists/e1& e2&B) > P(God does 
not exist/ e1& e2&B).
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assumption (along with other things Tooley says about rightmaking 
and wrongmaking properties) to argue that wrongmaking property 
can be nullified, or its weight considerably reduced, by a property that 
is not rightmaking. If this is so, then in calculating the probability all 
things considered that God exists, Tooley needs to take into account 
not only known relevant rightmaking and wrongmaking properties 
of a particular action of choosing, Di, of a state of affairs Si, but also 
any other known properties of Di that are constitutively relevant to its 
rightness or wrongness. One can speculate about what a reworked cal-
culation would be like, but given that the foregoing points threaten the 
adequacy of his very definitions of ‘rightmaking property’ and ‘wrong-
making property’, what would be required is for Tooley to reconceptu-
alize the issues.
Secondly, section 2.3 gives rise to a second line of thought with the 
same general upshot. Either Tooley takes a very liberal approach to his 
talk of properties—for example, regarding ‘x possesses Fness’ as merely 
a stylistic variant of ‘x is F’—or else he adopts a metaphysically serious 
theory of properties that is sparse and yet recognizes the existence of 
first-order properties such as Choosing not to prevent the death of many 
people and second-order properties such as Being rightmaking. If he 
chooses the first alternative, he will have to acknowledge that that there 
are infinitely many unknown rightmaking and wrongmaking proper-
ties. In that case, his derivation of G3 will fail in the way I explained in 
section 2.3. If Tooley chooses the second alternative, he needs to explain 
how the rich array of moral truths about an action is grounded in the 
sparse array of morally relevant properties of the action. He must allay 
doubts as to whether there are truths constitutively relevant to the right-
ness or wrongness of an action to which there do not correspond any of 
the action’s rightmaking or wrongmaking properties (or any combina-
tion of its rightmaking or wrongmaking properties). If there are such 
truths then he needs to take account of them in his argument for MC; he 
has not done so.
I will spend the rest of this section giving other reasons for believing 
that MC is false—at least, that it is false if ‘the argument from evil’ refers 
to the deontological argument stated and defended in Tooley’s chapters 
in Knowledge of God.
Let us focus on G3 and its relation to MC. Since (16) and (21) explic-
itly involve logical probability, and since Tooley is employing Carnapian 
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inductive logic, it is safe to say that he intends the consequent of G3 to 
involve logical probability. Logical probability statements are either nec-
essarily true or necessarily false, and so their truth-value is independent 
of contingent truths. The antecedent of G3 is contingent, since it entails 
the existence of actions of the kind it describes. Therefore the logical 
probability statement constituting G3’s consequent is independent of 
G3’s antecedent. In that case, Tooley needs to bring the antecedent inside 
the logical probability operator, somehow.
G3 cannot, however, be straightforwardly identified with the 
proposition
(G3a) The logical probability that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, 
morally perfect, and omnitemporal person, given that there exist states 
of affairs S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn which are preventable, respectively, at times 
t1, t2, t3, t3, t4, . . . tn, and are such that, for each Si, choosing not to prevent 
Si is an action that, judged by known rightmaking and wrongmaking 
properties, is prima facie wrong, is less than 1/(n + 1).
For this leaves out the idea, present in G3 itself, of probability all things con-
sidered. Nevertheless, adding the words ‘and given also that the foregoing 
is our total evidence’ immediately before the words ‘is prima facie wrong’ 
will achieve nothing that was not already achieved by G3a as it stands.32
Obviously, if we know that G3a is true, then in possible worlds in which 
we know that our total evidence is that there exist states of affairs S1, S2, 
S3, S4, . . . Sn that are preventable, respectively, at times t1, t2, t3, t3, t4, . . . tn, 
and are such that, for each Si, choosing not to prevent Si is an action that, 
judged by known rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, is prima 
facie wrong, we can properly infer that the logical probability, relative 
to our total evidence, that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, morally 
perfect, and omnitemporal person, is less than 1/(n + 1).33
But it is obvious that none of these worlds is the actual world. In the 
actual world, we know a vast amount more that has a bearing on whether 
32 In general, leaving aside special cases such as ones in which e is our total evidence is a 
conjunct of h, P(h/e) = N if and only if P(h/(e & (e is our total evidence)) = N.
33 Who are the people to whom each Si’s known rightmaking and wrongmaking prop-
erties are known? The argument will not work if e.g. a different knower is involved for each 
event. Let us take the knowers to be the readers of this book. Thus all the Si, and all their 
respective known rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, are known by every reader 
of this book.
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God exists. In fairness to Tooley, we should remember that his main con-
clusion MC (Quotation 1) is carefully qualified: it does not purport to 
cover either the epistemic possibility that there is countervailing positive 
evidence in support of the existence of God or the epistemic possibility 
that belief in the existence of God can be shown to be non-inferentially 
justified.34 We should also remember that he thinks that our total evi-
dence includes such propositions as n > 109 and The Lisbon earthquake 
killed approximately 60,000 people.35
Nevertheless, Tooley also believes that our total evidence includes 
no propositions that overthrow or greatly weaken the strong prima 
facie justification, provided by his argument for G3, of the proposition 
Anyone’s allowing (or, alternatively, God’s allowing, if God exists) all of 
S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn would be wrong. Of course I have been denying that the 
argument for G3 does provide strong prima facie justification of the latter 
proposition, but I will suspend this denial for a moment, for the sake of 
discussion. There remain important countervailing considerations that 
Tooley needs to consider before reaffirming his belief.
In God, the Best and Evil, for example, I argued that it is permissible 
for God, if he exists, to allow there to be a lot of human suffering and 
dysfunction, and also a lot of wrongdoing. Furthermore, I argued that 
it is permissible for God, if he exists, to allow suffering and dysfunction 
to be distributed unequally, and in ways that do not reflect individuals’ 
moral standing. When Tooley infers MC from G3 together with a high 
value for n, he seems not to notice the need to seriously consider claims 
such as mine. (This is not surprising, given that it would be a compli-
cated business to map my claims onto propositions about rightmaking 
and wrongmaking properties of a divine decision to not prevent the 
Lisbon earthquake.) Obviously, if we have strong reasons to believe that 
God’s allowing a great many of S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn would not be wrong, 
the latter truth, when included in our total ‘evidence’, may overthrow 
34 In Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 241–6, Tooley rejects the view that theistic belief is 
non-inferentially justified; I discussed the issue in Langtry, 1989. In Tooley, 1991, 102–4, 
he argued that most arguments for the existence of God ‘provide, at best, very tenuous 
grounds for any conclusion concerning the moral character of any omnipotent and 
omniscient being who may happen to exist, and almost none of them provide any support 
for the hypothesis that there is an omnipotent and omniscient being who is also morally 
perfect’.
35 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 142, 119.
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or greatly weaken whatever inductively based justification argument we 
have had for the proposition God’s allowing all of S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . Sn would 
be wrong.36
Let me sum up this section. Even if we neglect the questions whether our 
total evidence includes empirical truths that provide significant support for 
the existence of God, and whether some people are noninferentially justi-
fied in believing (whether firmly or tentatively) that God exists, the fore-
going considerations show that the third stage of Tooley’s deontological 
argument from evil gives us little reason to believe that the logical probabil-
ity that God exists, relative to our total evidence excluding empirical evi-
dence supporting the existence of God, is less than 1/109 (Tooley’s estimate), 
or even significantly less than the a priori probability that God exists.37
6. An Alternative Analysis of the Inductive 
Issues
Since Tooley’s argument for MC is unsatisfactory in a number of ways, 
we need an alternative way of analysing the bearing on theism of the 
occurrence of a great many particular instances of evil. (Although Tooley 
surveys a wide variety of kinds of evil in section 4.2 of his main chapter, 
information about these kinds does not play a role in his argument from 
evil.) How do the issues look if we avoid talk of rightmaking and wrong-
making properties of actions, but nevertheless try to retain significant 
connection with G3 or G3a?
36 In Tooley, 2012a, 145–6, he says, briefly, that theodicies typically involve highly dis-
putable moral premises—e.g. the premise that God’s not having intervened to facilitate 
an attempt to assassinate Hitler possesses the rightmaking property Leaving the world 
one where agents can freely bring about very great evils, and this property outweighs the 
wrongmaking property choosing not to facilitate the prevention of the suffering and deaths 
of millions of Holocaust victims. My foregoing remarks about suffering and dysfunction 
do not commit me to the stated proposition; the central evaluative premise underlying my 
own partial theodicy is defended in Langtry, 2008, 168–72. In Tooley 2012b, he discusses 
some recent theodicies, but what he says does not vitiate the point I am making in the 
main text. (The argument of my next section does not rely on my partial theodicy.)
37 It might be thought that if G3a were true then its truth would be a major obstacle or 
discouraging hindrance to current and future attempts to argue positively in favour of the 
existence of God. This is not so. After all, incoming evidence frequently leads you, without 
hesitation, to assign high posterior probabilities to hypotheses whose prior probabilities 
were very low—e.g. when you came to believe that I wrote the exact sequence of words that 
happens to make up the first sentence of this footnote.
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The specific inductive logic Tooley employs is the one propounded by 
Carnap (1962). Tooley declares, however, that
philosophers who favor a different inductive logic will be able, I believe, to recast 
the following argument in their own preferred terms, while readers who do not 
share my optimism about the existence of an objectively correct inductive logic 
will be able to reinterpret the argument in terms of subjective probabilities.38
Accordingly, he is unlikely to object to the Bayesian framework used to 
formulate the following line of thought.
Let us consider the bearing of some evidence E2 on the existence of 
God, in the setting constituted by background evidence that is divided 
into two parts, E1 and K.
Let E1 be a proposition listing all known instances of evil S1, S2, 
 . . . Sn + m and saying that it does so.39 We know, for example, that very 
many people died of the Black Death in the fourteenth century. Let us 
use the name ‘BD1’ to rigidly designate the first person to do so, ‘BD2’ 
to rigidly designate the second, and so on. Various states of affairs 
involving BD1 will appear amongst the items on the list S1, S2, . . . Sn + m, 
such as BD1’s experiencing pain in his or her lymph nodes.40
Let G be the proposition There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and 
perfectly good person (which I will abbreviate as God exists).
Let E2 be the proposition Either God does not exist, or else he does and 
there is a large subset {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} of {S1, S2, . . . , Sn + m} such that for every 
member Si of the subset, the known morally relevant truths about Si consti-
tute a strong prima facie case for believing that God should not have allowed 
Si to be actual.
Let J be the proposition God exists, and there is a large subset {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} 
of {S1, S2, . . . , Sn + m} such that for every member Si of the subset, the known mor-
ally relevant truths about Si constitute a strong prima facie case for believing 
38 Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, 135.
39 There may be no one who can state E1 and recognize E1 thus stated to be true, just as 
no one can list every person x such that all your friends know that they have met x. This 
possibility does not constitute a problem for my argument. After all, Tooley does not need 
it to be the case that there is someone who, for n > 109, can state a premise listing at least n 
states of affairs S1, S2, S3, S4, . . . , Sn which are preventable, respectively, at times t1, t2, t3, t3, 
t4, . . . tn, and are such that, for each Si, choosing not to prevent Si is an action that, judged by 
known rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, is prima facie wrong.
40 Notice that while E1 describes S1, S2, . . . , Sn as evil, Tooley’s G3 does not. The concept 
of evil is discussed in Langtry, 2008, 42–6.
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that God should not have allowed Si to be actual. Notice that E2 is logically 
equivalent to Either ~G or J, that G&E2 entails J, and that J entails E2.
Let K be all the empirical information shared by all the readers of this 
book, excluding E1, E2, and propositions that are epistemically posterior 
to E1&E2.
According to Bayes’s Theorem,
P G E2&E1&K




( ) ( ) ( )( )
Consider the right hand side of the foregoing equation—specifically, 
for now, the term P(E2/G&E1&K). Since E2 is logically equivalent to 
Either ~G or J, and J is incompatible with ~G, P(E2/G&E1&K) = P(~G/
G&E1&K) + P(J/G&E1&K). Since, obviously, P(~G/G&E1&K) = 0, it fol-
lows that P(E2/G&E1&K) = P(J/G&E1&K).
A very high estimated value for P(J/G&E1&K) is plausible in the 
light of the fact that K includes truths about limitations on human 
cognitive capacities, and about our ignorance about the nature, cir-
cumstances, and effects of hugely many known particular bad states 
of affairs. For example, although we can infer a lot about BD1 from 
the fact that he or she was a human being who died of the Black Death 
(together with K), we do not know anything about his or her distinc-
tive life-history and personal traits; nor do we know anything about 
the effects of BD1’s dying, and dying in this horrible way, on BD1’s 
relatives, friends, or anyone else. So given G&K, and given that E1 lists 
BD1’s experiencing various distressing symptoms universal amongst 
Black Death victims, it is utterly unsurprising that we are aware of 
truths counting morally against God’s allowing this particular state 
of affairs to occur but are unaware of any truths that count morally in 
favour of his doing so and that defeat the former truths. At least, it is 
unsurprising given that K does not contain various proposed theodi-
cies which would, if God were to exist, justify his allowing there to be 
severe suffering.41
It might be suggested that, given G&E1&K, one would expect God to 
ensure that we were aware of an outweighing moral consideration sufficing 
41 This stipulation about K (which was already implicit in my introduction of K) reflects 
the fact that Tooley’s contributions to Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, do not engage with pro-
posed theodicies for suffering.
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to justify God’s allowing BD1 to suffer and die as he or she did. But why 
should we believe this? After all, for all we know, if God exists then the 
truth that sufficed to justify God in allowing the death of BD1 might have 
only partial overlap with the truth that sufficed to justify God in allowing 
the death of BD2, and so on. These truths might themselves be quite com-
plex, in each case involving details of many individuals’ life-histories. 
God might well have many reasons for not providing the readers of this 
book, in the twenty-first century, with all this detail.42
The set of particular evil states of affairs involved in the Black Death 
of the fourteenth century is a large subset of {S1, S2, . . . Sn} such that for 
every member of the subset, the known morally relevant truths about 
Si constitute a strong prima facie case for believing that God should not 
have allowed Si to be actual. I conclude that P(J/G&E1&K) is high, and 
therefore that P(E2/G&E1&K) is high.
Let us turn our attention now to P(E2/E1&K). The foregoing argu-
ment can easily be adapted to support the view that P(E2/E1&K) is 
high. Is there reason to believe that it is higher than P(E2/G&E1&K)? 
One putative reason has already been foreshadowed, and in effect dis-
missed: given that God exists, for each Si we would expect him to pro-
vide us with evidence which defeated the strong prima facie case for 
believing that God should not have allowed Si to be actual, whereas if we 
were not to assume that God exists then we would not expect to possess 
evidence which would (if God were to exist) justify him in allowing Si to 
be actual. In the absence of some better proposed reason—I am aware of 
none—we have no reason to believe that P(E2/E1&K) > P(E2/G&E1&K), 
and therefore no reason to believe P(G/E2&E1&K) < P(G/E1&K), i.e. that 
E2 disconfirms G.
The foregoing probabilistic analysis does not purport to establish that 
known truths concerning evil do not provide the basis for a strong objec-
tion to the existence of God. I claim instead that a specific, highly sche-
matic argument I constructed—one that mirrors Tooley’s deontological 
argument as closely as is feasible while avoiding the problems I  have 
42 The foregoing two paragraphs do not involve sceptical theism. For the considera-
tions sufficing for the purposes of my argument do not pertain to general human cognitive 
limitations with respect to value and thus God’s reasons for action but instead pertain to 
‘our’ unsurprising de facto ignorance of empirical details and accordingly of reasons for 
action by God (or other, finite but powerful and well-placed agents) which might be gener-
ated by such empirical details.
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highlighted in earlier sections—does not constitute a strong objection to 
the existence of God.
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